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HARVARD LAW REVIEW

I

FAIRNESS AND UTILITY IN TORT THEORY
George P. Fletcher *
Professor Fletcher challenges the traditional account of the development of tort doctrine as a shift from an unmoral standard of
strict liability for directly causing harm to a moral standard based
on fault. He then sets out two paradigms of liability to serve as constructs for understandingcompeting ideological viewpoints about the
proper role of tort sanctions. He asserts that the paradigm of reciprocity, which looks only to the degree of risk imposed by the
parties to a lawsuit on each other, and to the existence of possible
excusing conditions, provides greater protection of individual interests than the paradigm of reasonableness, which assigns liability
instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus. Finally, Professor Fletcher examines stylistic differences between the two paradigms which may explain the modern preference for the paradigm
of reasonableness.

I. Two PARADIGMS

OF LIABILITY

T

ORT theory is suffering from declining expectations. Commentators still chronicle cases and expound doctrine for
practitioners. But the thrust of the academic literature is to
convert the tort system into something other than a mechanism for
determining the just distribution of accident losses. Some writers
seek to convert the set of discrete litigations into a makeshift medium of accident insurance or into a mechanism for maximizing
social utility by shifting the costs of accidents (or accident prevention) to the party to whom it represents the least disutility.
Thus the journals cultivate the idiom of cost-spreading, riskdistribution and cost-avoidance.' Discussed less and less are
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.A. University
of California at Berkeley, i96o; J.D. University of Chicago, x964; M. Comp. L.
University of Chicago, 1965.
'The leading work is G. CALABRESI, Tni CosTS or AccD uITs (1970) (hereinafter cited as CALABRESII. See also A. EHRENZAVEIG, NEGLIGENCE WrrnOUT FAULrT
(i95i), reprinted in 54 CALiF. L. REV. 1422 (x966); J. FLEmG, TEM LAW OF
TORTS 9-14 (3d ed. 1965); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach
to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Does
the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAw & CO'NTEMP.
PROB. 429 (i968); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (i961); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HiAv. L. REv. 401 (i959); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk
Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1,72 (1952).
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precisely those questions that make tort law a unique repository
of intuitions of corrective justice: What is the relevance of riskcreating conduct to the just distribution of wealth? What is the
rationale for an individual's "right" to recover for his losses?
What are the criteria for justly singling out some people and making them, and not their neighbors, bear the costs of accidents?
These persistent normative questions are the stuff of tort theory,
but they are now too often ignored for the sake of inquiries about
insurance and the efficient allocation of resources.
The fashionable questions of the time are instrumentalist: 2
What social value does the rule of liability further in this case?
Does it advance a desirable goal, such as compensation, deterrence, risk-distribution, or minimization of accident costs? True,
within this instrumentalist framework some writers are concerned
about the goal of vindicating the community's sense of fairness.'
But this approach generally makes the issue of fairness look like
the other goals of the tort system. Any other notion of fairness one that is not a goal, but a non-instrumentalist reason for redistributing losses -strikes some contemporary writers as akin
-

2 For a discussion of instrumentalism in legal reasoning, see Dworkin, Morality

and the Law, N.Y. Rav. BOOKS, May 22, 1969, at 29.
3
See CALABRESI 291-308; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmES, THE
(1956)

LAW oF TORTS

743

[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMaES] ("[The law of torts] must satisfy

the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling of what is fair and
just."). Professors Keeton and O'Connell discuss the obligations of motorists without converting the issue into a question of community expectations. R. KEETON &

J.

O'CoNINLL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFI C VicT=M 256-72 (1965).

'This bias toward converting values which are ends in themselves into instrumentalist goals is well illustrated by the history of the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases. The leading modern decisions establishing the exclusionary rule relied on two prominent rationales for the rule: (I) the imperative of
judicial integrity, and (2) the desirability of deterring unconstitutional police
behavior. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (i961); Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (ig6o). Preserving judicial integrity is a non-instrumentalist
value-like retribution, fairness, and justice. One preserves judicial integrity not
because it will produce good in the future but because it is "imperative" -it
is
in the nature of the judicial process -to
do so. This is not the kind of value with
which most writers in recent years could feel comfortable. As a result, the literature tended to tie the exclusionary rule almost exclusively to the goal of deterring
improper police behavior. See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures:
Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1953) ; LaFave & Remington, Controlling
the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1002-03 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cni. L. RaV. 665, 668-71 (970). The implication of tying the exclusionary rule to the goal of deterrence is that if suppressing
evidence does not in fact deter the police-and there is reason to believe that it
does not, see L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIMaE
'OI, 183-99 (1967) -then
the entire justification for the rule collapses. See the
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to a nonrational community taboo.5
Reluctant as they are to assay issues of fairness, tort theorists
tend to regard the existing doctrinal framework of fault and
strict liability as sufficiently rich to express competing views about
fairly shifting losses.' This conceptual framework accounts for a
number of traditional beliefs about tort law history. One of these
beliefs is that'the ascendancy of fault in the late nineteenth century reflected the infusion of moral sensibility into the law of
torts.7 That new moral sensibility is expressed sometimes as the
principle that wrongdoers ought to pay for their wrongs' Another traditional view is that strict tort liability is the analogue of
strict criminal liability, and that if the latter is suspect, so is the
former.' The underlying assumption of both these tenets is that
negligence and strict liability are antithetical rationales of liability. This assumed antithesis is readily invoked to explain the
ebbs and flows of tort liability. Strict liability is said to have
prevailed in early tort history, fault supposedly held sway in the
late nineteenth century, with strict liability now gaining ground. 10
These beliefs about tort history are ubiquitously held," but
to varying degrees they are all false or at best superficial. There
has no doubt been a deep ideological struggle in the tort law
of the last century and a half. But, as I shall argue, it is not
the struggle between negligence and fault on the one hand, and
strict liability on the other. Rather, the confrontation is between
portentous dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
The distinctive characteristic of non-instrumentalist claims is that their validity
does not depend on the consequences of the court's decision. Whether a court protects judicial integrity or achieves a fair result turns on an assessment of the
facts of the dispute, not on a correct prediction of what may follow.
Calabresi's analysis is instructive. He reasons that the issue of fairness must
involve "moral attitudes," CALABRESI 294, and then considers the taboo against
fornication
as an example of "moral attitudes." Id. at 295.
6
See, e.g., W. BLum. & H. KAIvEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE

(1965); Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815 (1967).
'See 0. HoLmEs, TmF CoAmo N LAW 79-80 (188i); Ames, Law and Morals,
22 HARv. L. REV. 97, 99 (19o8); p. 564 infra.
'See, e.g., Lord Atkin's opinion in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321] A.C. 562,
579.
O See 3. SALMOND, LAW Or TORTS 12-13 (6th ed. 1924); cf. Smith, Tort and
Absolute Liability -Suggested
Changes in Classification (pts. 1-3), 30 HARV. L.
REV. 241, 319, 409 (1917).
°See Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV.
359 (1951).
11Most treatise writers agree with this outline, though they may no longer
regard strict liability as aberrant. See FLEMING, supra note I, at 289-90; HARPER
& JAMES 785-88; W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 16-i9 (4th ed. i97I) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
LAW PROBLEM: AuTo COMPENSATION PLANS
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two radically different paradigms for analyzing tort liability 12 __
paradigms which represent a complex of views about (i) the appropriate standard of liability, (2) the appropriate style of legal
reasoning, and (3) the relationship between the resolution of individual disputes and the community's welfare.
These paradigms of liability cut across traditional doctrinal
lines, 3 creating a deep ideological cleavage between two ways of
resolving tort disputes. The conflict is whether judges should
look solely at the claims and interests of the parties before
the court, or resolve seemingly private disputes in a way that
serves the interests of the community as a whole. From this
cleavage spring divergent ways of looking at concepts like fault,
rights of recovery, and excuses from liability. Do these concepts
provide a medium of doing justice between the parties, or are they
a medium for serving the interests of the community? A stand
on this threshhold question generates an interrelated set of views,
including a characteristic style of legal rhetoric. In this essay I
wish to explicate these two paradigms of liability, show their operation in the case law "4 and thus enrich the conceptual tools
with which we analyze tort liability and the patterns of tort history.
Of the two paradigms, I shall call the first the paradigm of
reciprocity. According to this view, the two central issues of
tort law -whether
the victim is entitled to recover and whether
the defendant ought to pay - are distinct issues, each resolvable
without looking beyond the case at hand. Whether the victim is
so entitled depends exclusively on the nature of the victim's
activity when he was injured and on the risk created by the defendant. The social costs and utility of the risk are irrelevant, as
12 There is admittedly an element of fashion in using words like "paradigm"

and "model." My usage is patterned after T. Kum, THE STRUCTURE OP SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970), in which the concept of paradigmatic thinking is used
to account for the varieties of scientific response to identical data. My underlying
thought is that tort history is characterized by the same kind of conflict that
marked the competition between the phlogiston and oxidation theories of burning, id. at 53-56, or the conflict between Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy.
This approach is useful when what one wants to know is why judges (or scientists) are curious about and responsive to particular facts at particular stages of
history. Kuhn, himself, suggests the analogy between legal and scientific proceases; in explaining his concept of paradigm, he likens it to "an accepted judicial
decision in the common law." Id. at 23.
"2 See pp. 55o-51 infra.
" The text has the limited concern of assessing problems of fairness within
a litigation scheme. There is growing skepticism whether one-to-one litigation
is the appropriate vehicle for optimizing accidents and compensating victims.
See, e.g., CALABaESI 297-99; Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
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is the impact of the judgment on socially desirable forms of behavior. Further, according to this paradigm, if the victim is entitled to recover by virtue of the risk to which he was exposed,
there is an additional question of fairness in holding the riskcreator liable for the loss. This distinct 15 issue of fairness is expressed by asking whether the defendant's creating the relevant
risk was excused on the ground, say, that the defendant could not
have known of the risk latent in his conduct. To find that an act
is excused is in effect to say that there is no rational, fair basis
for distinguishing between the party causing harm and other
people. Whether we can rationally single out the defendant as the
loss-bearer depends on our expectations of when people ought to
be able to avoid risks. As will become clear in the course of
this discussion, these expectations should not always depend upon
the social utility of taking risks; rather they should often depend
on non-instrumentalist criteria for judging when men ought to
be able to avoid excessive risks of harm. For example, the
standard of uncommon "ultra-hazardous activities," introduced
by the first Restatement 16 is apparently a non-instrumentalist
standard: one looks only to the risk and not to its social utility
to determine whether it is ultra-hazardous.' Yet it is never made
clear by the Restatement why extra-hazardous risks warrant
"strict liability" while ordinarily hazardous risks do not.
As part of the explication of the first paradigm of liability,
I shall propose a specific standard of risk that makes sense
of the Restatement's emphasis on uncommon, extra-hazardous
5

" There might be many standards of liability that would distinguish between
the question of the victim's right to recover and the fairness of the risk-creator's
rendering compensation. The writ of Trespass recognized the distinction, answering
the first by determining whether the injury was directly caused, see Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 526 (C.P. 1773) (Blackstone, J.), and the second by
assessing whether the risk-creating act was attributable to inevitable accident,
see Cotterill v. Starkey, 173 Eng. Rep. 676 (Q.B. 1839) (inevitable accident);
Goodman v. Taylor, 172 Eng. Rep. xo31 (K.B. 1832) (inevitable accident);
Beckwith v. Shordike, 98 Eng. Rep. 91, 92 (K.B. 1767) (Ashton, J.) (defense of
involuntary trespass approved in principle but rejected on the facts); Mitten v.
Faudrye, 79 Eng. Rep. i259 (K.B. x625) (involuntary trespass). See generally 8
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY or ENcGLSH LAW 455-57 (2d ed. 1937). Common
law courts began to abandon the test of "directness" in the mid-nineteenth century, see note 86 infra, and in this century there has been no widely accepted
criterion of risk other than the standard of reasonableness. As I shall show below,
see pp. 556-59 ifnra, reasonableness is a standard that merges the issues of the
victim's right to recover with the fairness of the risk-creator's rendering compensation.
6

RESTATEMENT

or

TORTS §§ 519-20 (1938).

But cf. RESTATEAMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 520(f) (Tent. Draft No. io,
1964) (recognizing "the value of an activity to the community" as a factor bearing
on the classification of an activity as abnormally dangerous).
17
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risks, but which shows that the Restatement's theory is part of
a larger rationale of liability that cuts across negligence, intentional torts, and numerous pockets of strict liability. The general principle expressed in all of these situations governed by
diverse doctrinal standards is that a victim has a right to recover
for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in
order from those created by the victim and imposed on the defendant-in short, for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal
risks. Cases of liability are those in which the defendant generates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm, relative to the
victim's risk-creating activity. For example, a pilot or an airplane
owner subjects those beneath the path of flight to nonreciprocal
risks of harm. Conversely, cases of nonliability are those of
reciprocal risks, namely those in which the victim and the defendant subject each other to roughly the same degree of risk.
For example, two airplanes flying in the same vicinity subject
each other to reciprocal risks of a mid-air collision. Of course,
there are significant problems in determining when risks are nonreciprocal, and we shall turn to these difficulties later.1 s For now,
it is sufficient to note that the paradigm of reciprocity represents
(i) a bifurcation of the questions of who is entitled to compensation and who ought to pay, (2) a commitment to resolving both
of those issues by looking only to the activity of the victim and
the risk-creator, and (3) a specific criterion for determining who
is entitled to recover for loss, namely all those injured by nonreciprocal risks.
The conflicting paradigm of liability- which I shall call the
paradigm of reasonableness - represents a rejection of noninstrumentalist values and a commitment to the community's
welfare as the criterion for determining both who is entitled to
receive and who ought to pay compensation. Questions that are
distinct under the paradigm of reciprocity -namely,
is the risk
nonreciprocal and was it unexcused - are collapsed in this paradigm into a single test: was the risk unreasonable? The reasonableness of the risk thus determines both whether the victim is
entitled to compensation and whether the defendant ought to be
held liable. Reasonableness is determined by a straightforward
balancing of costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net social
utility (benefit), the victim is not entitled to recover from the
risk-creator; if the risk yields a net social disutility (cost), the
victim is entitled to recover. 19 The premises of this paradigm are
s See pp. 571-72 infra.

i 9 This is a simpler statement of the blancing test known as the "Learned Hand
formula," defined in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947). The same inquiry has been used to define the defense of necessity to in-
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that reasonableness provides a test of activities that ought to be
encouraged and that tort judgments are an appropriate medium
for encouraging them.
The function of both of these paradigms is to distinguish between those risks that represent a violation of individual interests and those that are the background risks that must be borne as
part of group living. The difference between the two paradigms
is captured by the test provided by each for filtering out background risks. The paradigm of reciprocity holds that we may be
expected to bear, without indemnification, those risks we all
impose reciprocally on each other. If we all drive, we must suffer the costs of ordinary driving. The paradigm of reasonableness,
on the other hand, holds that victims must absorb the costs of
reasonable risks, for these risks maximize the composite utility
of the group, even though they may not be mutually created
background risks.
The paradigm of reasonableness bears some resemblance to
present-day negligence, but it would be a mistake to associate
the two paradigms, respectively, with strict liability and negligence. As I shall argue, the paradigm of reciprocity cuts across
strict liability, negligence and intentional torts, and the paradigm
of reasonableness accounts for only a subset of negligence cases.
A large number of negligence cases lend themselves to analysis
under both paradigms. Suppose there is a collision between two
drivers on the highway, neither of whom has done anything out
of the ordinary. Neither would be liable to the other. That result might be explained on the ground that the risks are reciprocal; each endangers the other as much as he is endangered. Or
nonliability might be explained on the ground that ordinary
driving is a socially beneficial activity. As my exposition develops, I will account for this overlap and explain why some
cases of negligence liability fit only under the paradigm of reasonableness.

II. THE

PARADIGM OF RECIPROCITY

A. The Victim's Right to Recover
Our first task is to demonstrate the pervasive reliance of the
common law on the paradigm of reciprocity. The area that most
consistently reveals this paradigm is the one that now most lacks
doctrinal unity - namely, the disparate pockets of strict liability.
We speak of strict liability or "liability without fault" in cases
tentional torts and crimes. See Mouse's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B. i6og)
(justifying the jettisoning of ferry cargo to save the passengers); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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ranging from crashing airplanes 20 to suffering cattle to graze on
another's land.2 1 Yet the law of torts has never recognized a
general principle underlying these atomistic pockets of liability.
The Restatement's standard of ultra-hazardous activity speaks
only to a subclass of cases. In general, the diverse pockets of
strict liability represent cases in which the risk is reasonable and
legally immune to injunction. They are therefore all cases of
liability without fault in the limited sense in which fault means
taking an unreasonable risk.22 Beyond these characteristics distinguishing strict liability from negligence, there is no consensus
of criteria for attaching strict liability to some risks and not to
23
others .
I shall attempt to show that the paradigm of reciprocity accounts for the typical cases of strict liability 24
crashing airplanes,25 damage done by wild animals,2 6 and the more common
cases of blasting, fumigating and crop dusting.
To do this, I
shall consider in detail two leading, but seemingly diverse instances of liability for reasonable risk-taking - Rylands v.
Fletcher2 8 and Vincent v. Lake Erie TransportationCo. 29 The
point of focusing on these two cases is to generate a foundation
20

R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 52oA (Tent. Draft No. 12,
21McKee v. Trisler, 311 Ill. 536, 143 N.E. 69 (1924).
22

1966).

The word "fault" is also used to refer to the absence of excusing conditions,

see pp. 551, 556-57 infra, and in this sense strict liability is not liability without
fault.
21 In Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L.
REV. 886, 894-96 (1967), the author synthesizes strict liability under the principle
that every activity should be liable for its "distinctive risks."
21 It is important to distinguish the cases of strict liability discussed here from
strict products liability, a necessary element of which is an unreasonably dangerous defect in the product. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d i21
(9th Cir. 1968). See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965). Because of the market relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer, loss-shifting in
products-liability cases becomes a mechanism of insurance, changing the question
of fairness posed by imposing liability. See BLum & KALvE, supra note 6, at
58-61.
"See P. 548 infra and note 20 supra; PROSSER 514-16.
26 E.g., Collins v. Otto, i49 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962) (coyote bite) ; Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25 Q.B.D. 258 (1890) (escaped circus elephant). See generally PROSSER 496-5o3.
27E.g., Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. x931)
(storing explosives) ; Western Geophysical Co. of America v. Mason, 240 Ark. 767,
402 S.W.2d 657 (1966)
(blasting); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190
P.2d I (1948) (fumigating); Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. ig6i) (crop
dusting).
28159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, L.R. i Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3
H.L. 330 (1868).
29 io9 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (191o).
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for inducing the claim that unexcused nonreciprocity of risk is
the unifying feature of a broad spectrum of cases imposing liability under rubrics of both negligence and strict liability.
In Rylands v. Fletcher the plaintiff, a coal mine operator, had
suffered the flooding of his mine by water that the defendant
had pumped into a newly-erected reservoir on his own land. The
water broke through to an abandoned mine shaft under the defendant's land and thus found its way to the plaintiff's adjoining
mine. The engineers and contractors were negligent in not providing stronger supports for the reservoir; yet because they were
independent contractors, the defendant was not liable for their
negligence. Though the defendant's erecting and maintaining the
reservoir was legally permissible, the Exchequer Chamber found
for the plaintiff,3" and the House of Lords affirmed. 3 ' Blackburn's
opinion in the Exchequer Chamber focused on the defendant's
bringing on to his land, for his own purposes, "something which,
though harmless whilst it remain there, will naturally do mischief
if it escape." 32 Lord Cairns, writing in the House of Lords, reasoned that the defendant's activity rendered his use of the land
"non-natural"; accordingly, "that which the Defendants were
doing they were doing at their own peril." 13
Neither Blackburn's nor Cairns' account provides an adequate
rationale for liability. It may be that a body of water will
"naturally do mischief if it escapes," but so may many other
things, like water in a pipe, oil in a furnace tank, and fire in a
fireplace. It is unlikely that Blackburn would favor liability for
the harmful consequences of all these risky practices. Cairns'
rationale of non-natural use, for all its metaphysical pretensions,
may be closer to the policy issue at stake in the dispute. The
fact was that the defendant sought to use his land for a purpose
at odds with the use of land then prevailing in the community.
He thereby subjected the neighboring miners to a risk to which
they were not accustomed and which they would not regard as
a tolerable risk entailed by their way of life. Creating a risk
different from the prevailing risks in the community might be
what Lord Cairns had in mind in speaking of a non-natural use
of the land. A better term might have been "abnormal" or "inappropriate" use. Indeed these are the adjectives used in the
proposed revision of the Restatement to provide a more faithful
rendition of the case law tradition of strict liability.' 4
'°L.R. i Ex. 265 (1866).
3L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (i868).
32 L.R. i Ex. at 279.
L.R. 3 H.L. at 339.
34 RE sTATEmNT (SEcoND)

OF TomTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No.

io, I964).

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:537

A seemingly unrelated example of the same case law tradition
is Vincent v. Lake Erie TransporationCo., a i9io decision of
the Minnesota Supreme Court.35 The dispute arose from a ship
captain's keeping his vessel lashed to the plaintiff's dock during
a two-day storm when it would have been unreasonable, indeed
foolhardy, for him to set out to sea. The storm battered the ship
against the dock, causing damages assessed at five hundred dollars. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff even though
a prior case had recognized a ship captain's right to take shelter
from a storm by mooring his vessel to another's dock, even without consent. 6 The court's opinion conceded that keeping the
ship at dockside was justified and reasonable, yet it characterized
the defendant's damaging the dock as "prudently and advisedly
[availing]" himself of the plaintiff's property 7 Because the incident impressed the court as an implicit transfer of wealth, the
defendant was bound to rectify the transfer by compensating the
88
dock owner for his loss.
The rationales of Rylands and Vincent are obviously not
interchangeable. Building a reservoir is not availing oneself of
a neighbor's property. And mooring a ship to a wharf is not an
abnormal or "non-natural" use of either the ship or the wharf.
Yet by stripping the two cases of their rhetoric and by focusing
on the risks each defendant took, one can bring the two cases
within the same general principle. The critical feature of both
cases is that the defendant created a risk of harm to the plaintiff
that was of an order different from the risks that the plaintiff
imposed on the defendant.
Without the factor of nonreciprocal risk-creation, both cases
would have been decided differently. Suppose that Rylands had
built his reservoir in textile country, where there were numerous
mills, dams, and reservoirs, or suppose that two sailors secured
their ships in rough weather to a single buoy. In these situations
each party would subject the other to a risk, respectively, of
35 2O9 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (9IO).

"See Ploof v. Putnam, 8I Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (i9o8) (defendant dock owner,
whose servant unmoored the plaintiff's ship during a storm, held liable for the
ensuing damage to the ship and passengers).
37 iog Minn. at 460, 124 N.W. at 222.
3
This case is not entirely apt for my theory. The existence of a bargaining
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff poses the market adjustment
problems raised in note 24 supra. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonjault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726 (1965)
(arguing the irrelevance of the result in Vincent as to both the efficient allocation
of resources and the welfare of the parties). Accordingly, I treat the case as though
the defendant were a type of ship owner who never had to enter into bargains
with wharf owners. The case is also a seductive one for Professor Keeton. See
Keeton, supra note r, at 410-18; Keeton, supra note 23, at 895.
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inundation and abrasion. Where the risks are reciprocal among
the relevant parties, as they would be in these variations of Rylands and Vincent, a rule of strict liability does no more than
substitute one form of risk for another - the risk of liability for
the risk of personal loss. 9 Accordingly, it would make little
sense to extend strict liability to cases of reciprocal risk-taking,
unless one reasoned that in the short run some individuals might
suffer more than others and that these losses should be shifted
to other members of the community."'
Expressing the standard of strict liability as unexcused, nonreciprocal risk-taking provides an account not only of the Rylands and Vincent decisions, but of strict liability in general. It
is apparent, for example, that the uncommon, ultra-hazardous
activities pinpointed by the Restatement are readily subsumed
under the rationale of nonreciprocal risk-taking. If uncommon
activities are those with few participants, they are likely to be
activities generating nonreciprocal risks. Similarly, dangerous
activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting stand out
as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community. They represent
threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which all members
of the community contribute in roughly equal shares.
The rationale of nonreciprocal risk-taking accounts as well
for pockets of strict liability outside the coverage of the Restatement's sections on extra-hazardous activities. For example,
an individual is strictly liable for damage done by a wild animal
in his charge, but not for damage committed by his domesticated
pet. 4 Most people have pets, children, or friends whose presence
39 A student note nicely develops this point in the context of ultra-hazardous
activities. Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61 HARV. L. Rav. 515,
520 (I948).
40 One argument for so shifting losses would be that some individuals have
better access to insurance or are in a position (as are manufacturers) to invoke
market mechanisms to distribute losses over a large class of individuals. This argument assumes that distributing a loss "creates" utility by shifting units of the loss
to those who may bear them with less disutility. The premise is the increasing marginal utility of cumulative losses, which is the inverse of the decreasing marginal
utility of the dollar-the premise that underlies progressive income taxation. See
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 517-19 (196i); Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 417, 455-79 (1952). This is an argument of distributive
rather than corrective justice, for it turns on the defendant's wealth and status,
rather than his conduct. Using the tort system to redistribute negative wealth
(accident losses) violates the premise of corrective justice, namely that liability
should turn on what the defendant has done, rather than on who he is. See
THE Nico acamA ETmcs OF ApasroTLE, Book V, ch. 4, at i14-x5 (Ross transl.
World's Classics ed. 1954). What is at stake is keeping the institution of taxation
distinct from the institution of tort litigation.
41 See, e.g., Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361, 128 S.W.2d 564 (1939); Warrick
v. Farley, 95 Neb. 565, 145 N.W. 1020 (1914).
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creates some risk to neighbors and their property. These are
risks that offset each other; they are, as a class, reciprocal risks.
Yet bringing an unruly horse into the city goes beyond the accepted and shared level of risks in having pets, children, and
friends in one's household. If the defendant creates a risk that
exceeds those to which he is reciprocally subject, it seems fair
to hold him liable for the results of his aberrant indulgence.
Similarly, according to the latest version of the Restatement, airplane owners and pilots are strictly liable for ground damage,
but not for mid-air collisions." Risk of ground damage is nonreciprocal; homeowners do not create risks to airplanes flying
overhead. The risks of mid-air collisions, on the other hand,
are generated reciprocally by all those who fly the air lanes.
Accordingly, the threshold of liability for damage resulting from
mid-air collisions is higher than mere involvement in the activity
of flying. To be liable for collision damage to another flyer, the
pilot must fly negligently or the owner must maintain the plane
negligently; they must generate abnormal risks of collision to the
other planes aflight.
Negligently and intentionally caused harm also lend themselves to analysis as nonreciprocal risks. As a general matter,
principles of negligence liability apply in the context of activities,
like motoring and sporting ventures, in which the participants
all normally create and expose themselves to the same order of
risk.43 These are all pockets of reciprocal risk-taking. Sometimes
the risks are grave, as among motorists; sometimes they are
minimal, as among ballplayers. Whatever the magnitude of risk,
each participant contributes as much to the community of risk
as he suffers from exposure to other participants. To establish
liability for harm resulting from these activities, one must show
that the harm derives from a specific risk negligently engendered
in the course of the activity. Yet a negligent risk, an "unreasonable" risk, is but one that unduly exceeds the bounds of reciprocity. Thus, negligently created risks are nonreciprocal relative to
the risks generated by the drivers and ballplayers who engage
in the same activity in the customary way.
If a victim also creates a risk that unduly exceeds the reciprocal norm, we say that he is contributorily negligent and deny
42

See note

20

supra.

4' Negligence is, of course, prominent as well in the analysis of liability of

physicians to patients and occupiers
Cohen, Fault and the Automobile
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 164, 179 (1964).
consensual, bargaining relationships
24 supra.

of land to persons injured on the premises. See
Accident: The Lost Issue in California, 12
These are cases of injuries in the course of
and therefore pose special problems. Cf. note
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recovery. 44 The paradigm of reciprocity accounts for the denial
of recovery when the victim imposes excessive risks on the defendant, for the effect of contributory negligence is to render the
risks again reciprocal, and the defendant's risk-taking does not
subject the victim to a relative deprivation of security.4"
Thus, both strict liability and negligence express the rationale
of liability for unexcused, nonreciprocal risk-taking. The only
difference is that reciprocity in strict liability cases is analyzed
relative to the background of innocuous risks in the community,
while reciprocity in the types of negligence cases discussed above
is measured against the background of risk generated in specific
activities like motoring and skiing. To clarify the kinship of
negligence to strict liability, one should distinguish between two
different levels of risk-creation, each level associated with a defined community of risks. Keeping domestic pets is a reciprocal
risk relative to the community as a whole; driving is a reciprocal
risk relative to the community of those driving normally; and
driving negligently might be reciprocal relative to the even narrower community of those driving negligently. The paradigm
of reciprocity holds that in all communities of reciprocal risks,
those who cause damage ought not to be held liable."
4" E.g., Butterfield v. Forrester, 1o3 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. i8o9) (defendant
put a bar across the highway; plaintiff was riding without looking where he was
going). In many cases of contributory negligence the risk is self-regarding and
does not impose risks on the defendant. RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463
(1965); PROSSER 418-20. In these cases the rationale for denying recovery is
unrelated to the paradigm of reciprocity. There is considerable dispute about what
the rationale may be. Id. at 417-18; HARPER & JAMES 1193-1209.
" If the "last clear chance" doctrine is available, however, the victim may
recover despite his contributory negligence. Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal. 2d
107, 237 P.2d 977 (i95i) (motorist's last clear chance vis-a-vis a negligent motor
scooter driver) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479-80 (1965). A rationale
for this doctrine might be that the defendant's risk is nonreciprocal even as to the
class46 of victims taking negligent risks.
Suppose a motorist runs down a pedestrian on the way to his parked car.
Or suppose that an ambulance injures a pedestrian while speeding through the
streets to rescue another injured pedestrian. These hypothetical problems pose
puzzles at the fringes of the paradigm of reciprocity. The first is the question
whether reciprocity must be temporal; the second, whether the interests of the
victim or of the class he represents ought to bear on the analysis of reciprocity.
These problems require further thought. Cf. Professor Fried's theory of the risk
pool, which treats risks occurring at different times as offsetting. C. FazED, AN
ANATOMY OF VA UEs 177-93 (1970).
Problems in defining communities of risks may account for the attractiveness
of the reasonableness paradigm today. The increased complexity and interdependence of modem society renders legal analysis based upon a concept of community
that presupposes clear lines of membership, relatively little overlapping, and a
fair degree of uniformity in the activities carried on, exceedingly difficult in many
cases. Cf. pp. 571-72 infra.
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To complete our account of the paradigm of reciprocity, we
should turn to one of its primary expressions: intentional torts,
particularly the torts of battery and assault. Several features of
the landlord's behavior in Carnes v. Thompson 47 in lunging at
the plaintiff and her husband with a pair of pliers make it stand
out from any of the risks that the plaintiff might then have been
creating in return. An intentional assault or battery represents
a rapid acceleration of risk, directed at a specific victim. These
features readily distinguish the intentional blow from the background of risk. Perceiving intentional blows as a form of nonreciprocal risk helps us understand why the defendant's malice
or animosity toward the victim eventually became unnecessary
to ground intentional torts.4 8 The nonreciprocity of risk, and the
deprivation of security it represents, render irrelevant the attitudes of the risk-creator.4 9
All of these manifestations of the paradigm of reciprocitystrict liability, negligence and intentional battery - express the
same principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the
right to roughly the same degree of security from risk. By
analogy to John Rawls' first principle of justice,5" the principle
might read: we all have the right to the maximum amount of
security compatible with a like security for everyone else. This
means that we are subject to harm, without compensation, from
background risks, but that no one may suffer harm from additional risks without recourse for damages against the risk-creator.
Compensation is a surrogate for the individual's right to the same
security as enjoyed by others. But the violation of the right to
equal security does not mean that one should be able to enjoin
the risk-creating activity or impose criminal penalties against
the risk-creator. The interests of society may often require a
disproportionate distribution of risk. Yet, according to the paradigm of reciprocity, the interests of the individual require us
to grant compensation whenever this disproportionate distribu48

(Mo. X932).
Vosburg v. Putney, 8o Wis. 523, 5o N.W. 403 (I89i). Animosity would
obviously be relevant to the issue of punitive damages, see PROSSER 9-O, the
formal rationales for which are retribution and deterrence, not compensation.
49 This account of battery also explains the softening of the intent requirement
to permit recovery when the defendant "knew to a substantial certainty" that his
act would result in the victim's falling. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d. i97, 279
P.2d iog (1955) (defendant, a young boy, pulled a chair out from the spot where
the victim was about to sit down).
10 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHILOsoPacAL Rav. x64, 165 (1958) ("[E]ach
person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most
extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all."). The ideas expressed in
Justice as Fairness are elaborated in J.RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE (1971).
47
4

1See

S.W.2d 903
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tion of risk injures someone subject to more than his fair share
of risk.51
B. Excusing Nonreciprocal Risks

If the victim's injury results from a nonreciprocal risk of
harm, the paradigm of reciprocity tells us that the victim is
entitled to compensation. Should not the defendant then be under a duty to pay? Not always. For the paradigm also holds
that nonreciprocal risk-creation may sometimes be excused, and
we must inquire further, into the fairness of requiring the defendant to render compensation. We must determine whether
there may be factors in a particular situation which would excuse
this defendant from paying compensation.
Though the King's Bench favored liability in its 1616 decision of Weaver v. Ward, 2 it digressed to list some hypothetical
examples where directly causing harm would be excused and
therefore exempt from liability. One kind of excuse would be
the defendant being physically compelled to act, as if someone
took his hand and struck a third person. 3 Another kind would
be the defendant's accidentally causing harm, as when the plaintiff suddenly appeared in the path of his musket fire.5" The
rationale for denying liability in these cases, as the court put it,
is that the defendant acted "utterly without . . . fault."

If a man trespasses against another, why should it matter
whether he acts with "fault" or not? What the King's Bench
must have been saying is that if a man injures another without
fault on his part, there is no rational and fair basis for charging
the costs of the accident to him rather than to an arbitrary third
person. The inquiry about fault and excusability is an inquiry
about rationally singling out the party immediately causing harm
as the bearer of liability. Absent an excuse, the trespassory, riskcreating act provides a sufficient basis for imputing liability.
Finding that the act is excused, however, is tantamount to per"' It might be that requiring the risk-creator to render compensation would
be economically tantamount to enjoining the risk-creating activity. See note 115
infra. If imposing a private duty of compensation for injuries resulting from
nonreciprocal risk-taking has an undesirable economic impact on the defendant,
the just solution would not be to deny compensation, but either to subsidize the
defendant or institute a public compensation scheme.
"280 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
z3 Id.
54 Id.
" "[Therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of
an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit) except it may be judged
utterly without his fault." Id.
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ceiving that the act is not a factor fairly distinguishing the trespassing party from all other possible candidates for liability.
It is important to note that the inquiry whether the act sets
the actor apart and makes him a fit candidate for liability was
originally a non-instrumentalist inquiry. The King's Bench in
1616 did not ask: what good will follow from holding that
physical compulsion and unavoidable accident constitute good
excuses? 16 The question was rather: How should we perceive
an act done under compulsion? Is it the same as no act at all?
Or does it set the actor off from his fellow men? Thus, excusing
is not an assessment of consequences, but a perception of moral
equivalence. It is a judgment that an act causing harm ought to
be treated as no act at all.
The hypotheticals of Weaver v. Ward correspond to the
Aristotelian excusing categories of compulsion and unavoidable
ignorance.5 7 Each of these has spawned a line of cases denying
liability in cases of inordinate risk-creation. The excuse of compulsion has found expression in the emergency doctrine, which
excuses excessive risks created in cases in which the defendant
is caught in an unexpected, personally dangerous situation. 8 In
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co., 9 for example, it was

thought excusable for a cab driver to jump from his moving cab
in order to escape from a threatening gunman on the running

board. In view of the crowd of pedestrians nearby, the driver
clearly took a risk that generated a net danger to human life.

It was thus an unreasonable, excessive, and unjustified risk. Yet
the overwhelmingly coercive circumstances meant that he, personally, was excused from fleeing the moving cab.6" An example
" This is not to say that utilitarians have not attempted to devise an account of
excuse based on the beneficial consequences to society of recognizing excuses. See

J.

BENTHAMA,

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

173 (19o7). For an effective critique of Bentham, see H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon
to the Principles of Punishment, 6o ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y PROCEEDINGS i (1959), in
H.L.A. HART, PU-ISMIENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
" THE NICOMACHEAN EInICs OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, Book III, ch. I,
at 48 ("Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under
compulsion or owing to ignorance.").
"8 See e.g., St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. Rollins, 145 Me. 217, 74 A.2d 465
(1950) ; Majure v. Herrington, 243 Miss. 692, 139 So. 2d 635 (1962). The excuse is
not available if the defendant has created the emergency himself. See Whicher v.
Phinney, 124 F.2d 929 (ist Cir. 1942). See generally PROSSER 168-69.
5 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
6The rhetoric of reasonableness obscures the difference between assessing the
risk and excusing the defendant on the ground that pressures were too great to
permit the right decision. Cf. p. 56o infra. Yet it is clear that the emergency
doctrine functions as a personal excuse, for the defense is applicable even if the
actor made the wrong choice, i.e., took an objectively unreasonable risk. See St.
Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. Rollins, 145 Me. 217, 222, 74 A.2d 465, 468 (1950)
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of unavoidable ignorance excusing risk-creation is Smith v.
Lampe,61 in which the defendant honked his horn in an effort to
warn a tug that seemed to be heading toward shore in a dense
fog. As it happened, the honking coincided with a signal that
the tug captain expected would assist him in making port. Accordingly the captain steered his tug toward the honking rather
than away from it. That the defendant did not know of the
prearranged signal excused his contributing to the tug's going
aground. Under the facts of the case, the honking surely created an unreasonable risk of harm. If instantaneous injunctions
were possible, one would no doubt wish to enjoin the honking as
an excessive, illegal risk. Yet the defendant's ignorance of that
risk was also excusable. Under the circumstances he could not
fairly have been expected to inform himself of all possible interpretations of honking in a dense fog.
As expanded in these cases, the excuses of compulsion and
unavoidable ignorance added dimension to the hypotheticals put
in Weaver v. Ward. In Cordas and Smith we have to ask: What
can we fairly expect of the defendant under the circumstances?
Can we ask of a man that he remain in a car with a gun pointed
at him? Can we require that a man inform himself of all local
customs before honking his horn? Thus the question of rationally
singling out a party to bear liability becomes a question of what
we can fairly demand of an individual under unusual circumstances. Assessing the excusability of ignorance or of yielding to
compulsion can be an instrumentalist inquiry. As we increase or
decrease our demands, we accordingly stimulate future behavior.
Thus, setting the level of excusability could function as a level
of social control. Yet one can also think of excuses as expressions
of compassion for human failings in times of stress - expressions that are thought proper regardless of the impact on other
potential risk-creators.
Despite this tension between thinking of excusing conditions
in an instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist way, we can formulate two significant claims about the role of excuses in cases decided under the paradigm of reciprocity. First, excusing the riskcreator does not, in principle, undercut the victim's right to recover. In most cases, it is operationally irrelevant to posit a right
to recovery when the victim cannot in fact recover from the excused risk-creator. Yet it may be important to distinguish between victims of reciprocal, background risks and victims of
(admonishing against assessing the risk with hindsight); Kane v. Worcester Con182 Mass. 201, 65 N.E. 54 (1902) (.Holmes, C.J.) (the choice "may be
mistaken and yet prudent").
" 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 751 (1933).

sol. St. Ry.,
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nonreciprocal risks. The latter class of victims - those who have
been deprived of their equal share of security from risk- might
have a claim of priority in a social insurance scheme. Further,
for a variety of reasons, one might wish in certain classes of
cases to deny the availability of particular excuses, such as insanity in general or immaturity for teenage drivers. 2 Insanity
has always been a disfavored excuse; even the King's Bench in
Weaver v. Ward rejected lunacy as a defense." However, it is
important to perceive that to reject the excuse is not to provide
a rationale for recovery. It is not being injured by an insane
man that grounds a right to recovery, but being injured by a
nonreciprocal risk - as in every other case applying the paradigm of reciprocity. Rejecting the excuse merely permits the
independently established, but previously unenforceable right to
prevail.
Secondly, an even more significant claim is that these excuses
compulsion and unavoidable ignorance - are available in all
cases in which the right to recovery springs from being subjected
to a nonreciprocal risk of harm. We have already pointed out
the applicability of these excuses in negligence cases like Cordas
and Smith v. Lampe. What is surprising is to find them applicable
in cases of strict liability as well; strict liability is usually thought
of as an area where courts are insensitive to questions of fairness
to defendants. Admittedly, the excuses of compulsion and unavoidable ignorance do not often arise in strict liability cases,
for men who engage in activities like blasting, fumigating, and
crop dusting typically do so voluntarily and with knowledge of
the risks characteristic of the activity. Yet there have been cases
in which strict liability for keeping a vicious dog was denied on
the ground that the defendant did not know, and had no reason
to know, that his pet was dangerous. 64 And doctrines of proximate
cause provide a rubric for considering the excuse of unavoidable
ignorance under another name.65 In Madsen v. East Jordan
2 Daniels v. Evans, Io7 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966) rejected the defense of
immaturity in motoring cases and thus limited Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H.
5O, 153 A. 457 (193i) to cases in which the activity is "appropriate to [the
minor's] age, experience and wisdom." 107 N.H. at 408, 224 A.2d at 64.
62"[T]herefore if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass
.
" 8o Eng. Rep. at 284. See Alexander & Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse
for Civil Wrongs, 43 NoTRm DAmE LAW. 24 (1967).
64
See Fowler v. Helck, 278 Ky. 361, 128 S.W.2d 564 (1939); Warrick v. Farley, 95 Neb. 565, 145 N.W. 1020 (1914).
" In Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. i Ex. 265, 279-80 (1866), Blackburn, J.,
acknowledges the defenses of vis major and act of God. Both of these sound in
a theory of excuse. Vis major corresponds to the excuse of physical compulsion
recognized in Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. x616), and acts of God
are risks of which the defendant is presumably excusably ignorant.

1972]

FAIRNESS AND UTILITY

IrrigationCo.,6 6 for example, the defendant's blasting operations
frightened the mother mink on the plaintiff's farm, causing them
to kill 230 of their offspring. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a
demurrer to the complaint. In the court's judgment, the reaction
of the mother mink "was not within the realm of matters to be
anticipated." 67 This is precisely the factual judgment that would
warrant saying that the company's ignorance of this possible
result was excused, 68 yet the rubric of proximate cause provided
a doctrinally acceptable heading for dismissing the complaint.69
It is hard to find a case of strict liability raising the issue of
compulsion as an excuse. Yet if a pilot could flee a dangerous
situation only by taking off in his plane, as the cab driver in
Cordas escaped danger by leaping from his moving cab, would
there be rational grounds for distinguishing damage caused by
the airplane crash from damage caused by Cordas' cab? One
would think not. Both are cases of nonreciprocal risk-taking,
and both are cases in which unusual circumstances render it
unfair to expect the defendant to avoid the risk he creates.
The analysis of excuses in cases of strict liability would
apply as well in cases of intentional torts. Yet there are some
intentional torts, like trespass to land, where the excuse of unavoidable ignorance is unavailable.7 0 Where the tort fulfills subsidiary noncompensatory purposes, such as testing the title to
land, these divergent purposes might render excuses unavailable."
66

IO Utah

552, 125

P.2d 794 (1942).

6 Id. at 555, 125 P.2d at 795.
o Madsen is somewhat different from Smith v. Lampe, discussed at p. 553
supra. In Smith the driver was ignorant that honking could have any harmful
result. Here it is just the particular harm of which the defendant was unaware.
69 There seem to be two different types of proximate cause cases: (i) those that
function as a way of raising the excuse of unavoidable ignorance and (2) those
that hold that the damage is so atypical of the activity that even if the actor knew
the result would occur, he would not be liable. If there were a replay of the
facts in Madsen, with the defendant knowing of the risk to the mink, one would
be surprised if the result would be the same; on the other hand, if the oil
company in Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942)
knew of the risk that negligently starting a fire might startle a woman across
the street, causing her to fall over a chair and suffer a miscarriage, the court would
probably still find for the defendant. If this distinction is sound, it suggests that
foreseeability is an appropriate test of proximate cause only in the first category,
namely when the issue is really the excusability of the defendant's ignorance of the
risk. Cf. pp. 571-73 infra.
"6See, e.g., Maye v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 3o6 (i863) (mistake of miner as to
boundary between mines); Blatt v. McBarron, I61 Mass. 21, 36 N.E. 468 (1894)
(mistake of process server as to right of entry) ; RESTATEAMNT (SEoND) or TORTS
§ 164 (x965).
7 If the defendant could prevail by showing that his mistake was reasonable,
the court would not have to resolve the conflicting claims of title to the land.
Similarly, if the defendant in a defamation action could prevail by showing that
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Where compensation is the primary issue, however, one may
fairly conclude that the basic excuses acknowledged in Weaver
v. Ward-compulsion and unavoidable ignorance- transcend
doctrinal barriers and apply in all cases of nonreciprocal risktaking.
Recognizing the pervasiveness of nonreciprocity as a standard
of liability, as limited by the availability of excuses, should provide a new perspective on tort doctrine and demonstrate that
strict liability and negligence as applied in the cases discussed
above are not contrary theories of liability. Rather, strict liability and negligence appear to be complementary expressions of
the same paradigm of liability.
III.

THE PARADIGM OF REASONABLENESS

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the paradigm of reciprocity
dominated the law of personal injury. It accounted for cases of
strict liability and of intentional torts and for the distinction
implicit in the common law writ system between background
risks and risks directly violating the interests of others. 72 In the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the concepts underlying the paradigm of reciprocity gradually assumed new contours. A new paradigm emerged, which challenged all traditional
ideas of tort theory. The new paradigm challenged the assumption that the issue of liability could be decided on grounds of
fairness to both victim and defendant without considering the
impact of the decisions on the society at large. It further challenged the assumption that the victim's right to recovery was
distinguishable from the defendant's duty to pay. In short, the
new paradigm of reasonableness represented a new style of thinking about tort disputes.
The core of this revolutionary change was a shift in the
meaning of the word "fault." At its origins in the common law
of torts, the concept of fault served to unify the medley of excuses available to defendants who would otherwise be liable in
trespass for directly causing harm.73 As the new paradigm
emerged, fault came to be an inquiry about the context and the
he was reasonably mistaken about the truth of the defamatory statement, the court
would never reach the truth or falsity of the statement. To permit litigation of the
truth of the charge, the law of defamation rejects reasonable mistake as an excuse.
See Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920); Hulton &
Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [igio] A.C. 20. In both of these cases,
it was held irrelevant that the defendant did not intend his remarks to refer to
the plaintiff.
72 See notes I supra and 86 infra.
7
See pp. 551-52 supra.
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reasonableness of the defendant's risk-creating conduct. 4 Recasting fault from an inquiry about excuses into an inquiry about
the reasonableness of risk-taking laid the foundation for the new
paradigm of liability. It provided the medium for tying the
determination of liability to maximization of social utility, and
it led to the conceptual connection between the issue of fault and
the victim's right to recover. The essence of the shift is that the
claim of faultlessness ceased being an excuse and became a justification. The significance of this transformation is difficult to
appreciate today, for the concepts of excuse and justification have
themselves become obscure in our moral and legal thinking." To
clarify the conceptual metamorphosis of the fault concept, I must
pause to explicate the difference between justifying and excusing
conduct.
"4Unreasonable risk-taking--doing that which a reasonable man would not
do-is now the standard measure of negligence. See, e.g., PROSSER 145-51; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 232-83 (1965). But Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (defining negligence as the taking of
a "substantial and unjustified risk" and invoking the reasonable man only to
account for the blameworthiness of the negligent conduct).
75 Inadequate appreciation for the distinction between excuse and justification
is clearly seen today in negligence per se cases. Courts and commentators use the
terms "justification" and "excuse" interchangeably to refer to the criteria defeating
the statutory norm. See, e.g., Alarid v. Vanier, 5o Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (0958) ;
HARPER & JAMES ioo7-io. As a consequence, they are unable to satisfactorily
rationalize giving conclusive effect to the legislature's determination of safe conduct while at the same time permitting the jury to make the final determination
of the defendant's negligence. If excuse and justification are just two different
labels for a univocal concept, these goals do appear incompatible; the statute cannot be conclusive on the issue of negligence if the jury also decides the same issue.
Recognizing that the concept of fault is dualistic, that excusability is a separate
dimension of fault, would enable courts to regard the violation of a statute as
conclusive on negligence, but inconclusive on the excusability of the negligent conduct. Thus, the legislature would be given its due without sacrificing justice to
the individual defendant who can show, for example, that he was compelled to run
the illegal risk or prevented from perceiving its magnitude.
The distinction between excuse and justification in these cases was not always
so obscure. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920)
(Cardozo, J.) (defining "the unexcused omission of the statutory signals" as negligence per se) (emphasis added).
The MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(), 3.11() (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
(excused force is nevertheless unlawful force, but privileged or justified force is
not), maintained a distinction between excuse and justification in formulating a
definition of unlawful force for the purpose of delimiting the scope of self-defense.
But this distinction did not survive adoptation of the CODE in Illinois and Wisconsin. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7 (1969); VIS. STAT. § 939-42-.49 (1969).
See also GA. CODE § 26-ioll (1933) ("There being no rational distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide, it shall no longer exist."), as amended
§ 26-9oi. The distinction is very much alive among philosophers, see, e.g., Austin,
A Plea for Excuses, 57 ARISTOTELIAN Soc'z PROCEEDINGS I (1956-57), in FR.EEDOMa
AND REsPONsI ILIT 6 (H. Morris ed. 1961).
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The difference between justifying and excusing conditions is
most readily seen in the case of intentional conduct, particularly
intentional crimes. Typical cases of justified intentional conduct
are self-defense " and the use of force to effect an arrest.77 These
justificatory claims assess the reasonableness of using force under
the circumstances. The questions asked in seeking to justify an
intentional battery as self-defense relate to the social costs and
the social benefits of using force and to the wrongfulness of the
initial aggressor's conduct in attacking the defendant. The resolution of this cost-benefit analysis speaks to the legal permissibility and sometimes to the commendability of the act of using
force under the circumstances. Excuses, in contrast, focus not on
the costs and benefits of the act, but on the degree of the actor's
choice in engaging in it. Insanity and duress are raised as excuses even to concededly wrongful acts. 78 To resolve a claim of
insanity, we are led to inquire about the actor's personality, his
capacities under stress and the pressures under which he was
acting. Finding that the actor is excused by reason of insanity
is not to say that the act was right or even permissible, but merely
that the actor's freedom of choice was so impaired that he cannot
be held accountable for his wrongful deed.
Justifying and excusing claims bear different relationships to
the rule of liability. To justify conduct is to say that in the
future, conduct under similar circumstances will not be regarded
as wrongful or illegal. Excusing conduct, however, leaves intact
the imperative not to engage in the excused act. Acquitting a
76 Self-defense is routinely referred to today as an instance of justification.

See, e.g., MODEL PEnAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (including
self-defense in article 3 of the CODE, which is titled "General Principles of Justification"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1970) ("justifiable homicide"); note 75
supra. In contrast, Blackstone described se defendendo as an instance of excusable
homicide. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CO
ERTARIMS *183-84. In Blackstone's day, the
rubric of excusable homicide applied to those cases in which the defendant suffered only forfeiture of goods, but not execution or other punishment. See R.
PERKINS, CnAL

LAW 892 (1957).

77The clearest case of common law justification was that of a legal official
acting under authority of law. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *I78-79.
" The MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) acknowledges that
claims of insanity and duress are distinguishable from claims of justification and
does not include them within article 3's "General Principles of Justification."
Rather, they appear in §§ 4.oI and 2.o9 respectively.
The common law is ambivalent on the status of duress. The defense is not
recognized in homicide cases, State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 58 A. 953 (1904),
thus suggesting that the focus of the defense may be the rightness of the defendant's
act, rather than the involuntariness of the actor's response to external coercion.
German law unequivocally acknowledges that duress is an excuse and that it
applies even in homicide cases. STGB § 52 (C.H. Beck i97o); A. SCH6NxE & H.
SCHODER, STRATGESETZB-UC: KOM ENTAR 457 (i5th ed. 1970).
8
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man by reason of insanity does not change the norm prohibiting
murder. Rather, it represents a judgment that a particular person, acting under particular pressures at a particular time, cannot be held accountable for violating that norm. The difference
between changing the rule and finding in a particular case that
it does not apply is best captured by asking whether in finding
for the defendant the court recognizes a right to engage in the
activity. To justify conduct as self-defense is to recognize a
right to use force, but to excuse homicide under duress is not to
acknowledge a right to kill. It is rather to recognize that an
actor cannot be fairly blamed for having succumbed to pressures
requiring him to kill.79
The distinction between justifying and excusing conduct applies with equal coherence in analyzing risk-creating behavior.
Questions about the excusability of risk-creation focus on the
actor's personal circumstances and his capacity to avoid the risk.
Could he have resisted the intimidations of a gunman in his car?
Could he have found out about the risks latent in his conduct?
Questions about justification, on the other hand, look solely to
the risk, abstracted from the personality of the risk-creator. What
are the benefits of the risk? What are the costs? Does the risk
maximize utility? As the inquiry shifts from excusing to justifying risks, the actor and his traits become irrelevant. At the level
of justification, the only relevant question is whether the risk, on
balance, is socially desirable. Excusing a risk, as a personal judgment about the actor, leaves the right of the victim intact; but
justifying a risk recognizes the defendant's right to run that risk
vis-4-vis the victim. If the risk is justified in this sense, the
victim could hardly have a claim against the risk-creator. The
right of the risk-creator supplants the right of the victim to
80
recover.
That the fault requirement shifted its orientation from ex" This is fairly clear in the law of se defendendo, which is the one instance in
which the common law recognized an excuse to a homicide charge based on external pressure rather than the propriety of the act. See E. CoKE, THIRD INSTITUTE *55; note 78 supra. For the defense to be available, the defedant had
to first retreat to the wall if he could do so without risking his life and had
to have no other means than the use of force for preserving his own life. Coke
speaks of the killing in these cases as "being done upon inevitable cause." CoKE,
T~m INSTITUTE *55.
These issues are more thoroughly discussed in Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal
Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (I97i). For a
general account of the deficiencies in the common law approach to excusing conditions, see G. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 1971 (unpublished manuscript on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
'IT. CooLEY, A TREATISE oN THE LAw oF ToRTs 8z (1879) ("That which it
is right and lawful for one man to do cannot furnish the foundation for an action
in favor of another.").
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cusing to justifying risks had the following consequences: (i)
fault became a judgment about the risk, rather than about the
responsibility of the individual who created the risk; (2) fault
was no longer a question of fairness to the individual, but an
inquiry about the relative costs and benefits of particular risks;
(3) fault became a condition for recognizing the right of the
victim to recover. These three postures of the fault requirement
diverged radically from the paradigm of reciprocity. Together,
they provided the foundation for the paradigm of reasonableness,
a way of thinking that was to become a powerful ideological force
in tort thinking of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 8'
The reasonable man became a central, almost indispensable
figure in the paradigm of reasonableness.8 2 By asking what a
reasonable man would do under the circumstances, judges could
assay the issues both of justifying and excusing risks. Reasonable
men, presumably, seek to maximize utility; therefore, to ask what
a reasonable man would do is to inquire into the justifiability of
the risk." If the risk-running might be excused, say by reason
of the emergency doctrine or a particular defect like blindness
or immaturity, the jury instruction might specify the excusing
condition as one of the "circumstances" under which the conduct
of the reasonable man is to be assessed. If the court wished to
include or exclude a teenage driver's immaturity as a possible
excusing condition, it could define the relevant "circumstances"
accordingly. 4 Because the "reasonable man" test so adeptly
encompasses both issues of justification and excuse, it is not
surprising that the paradigm of reasonableness has led to the
blurring of that distinction in tort theory.8
81

The impact of the paradigm is not so much that negligence emerged as a

rationale of liability, for many cases of negligence are compatible with the paradigm of reciprocity. See pp. 548-49 supra. The ideological change was the conversion of each tort dispute into a medium for furthering social goals. See Prosser's discussion of "social engineering," PROSSER 14-16. This reorientation of the
process led eventually to the blurring of the issues of corrective justice and distributive justice discussed at note 40 supra.
82 For early references to "reasonableness" as the standard of negligence, see
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., r56 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. '856); COOLEY,
supra note 80, at 662. But cf. Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493
(C.P. 1837) ("a man of ordinary prudence"). Notions of "ordinary" and "normal" men are compatible with the paradigm of reciprocity; reciprocal risks are
those that ordinary men normally impose on each other. The shift to the "reasonable" man was significant, for it foreshadowed the normative balancing of the
interests implicit in the concept of reasonableness as an objective standard.
83
See pp. 558-59 supra.
84 See note 62 supra.
5
It is especially surprising that courts and commentators have not explicitly
perceived that the emergency doctrine functions to excuse unreasonable risks. See
cases cited note 58 supra; HARPER & JAMsES 938-40; PROSSER 168-70.
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No single appellate decision ushered in the paradigm of
reasonableness. It derived from a variety of sources. 6 If there
was a pivotal case, however, it was Brown v. Kendall,1 decided
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 185o. The facts
of the case were well-suited to blurring the distinction between
excusing the defendant's ignorance and assessing the utility of
the risk that he took. In an effort to separate two fighting dogs,
Kendall began beating them with a stick. Brown was standing
nearby, which Kendall presumably knew; and both he and Brown
moved about with the fighting dogs. At one point, when he had
just backed up to a position in front of Brown, Kendall raised
his stick, hitting Brown in the eye and causing serious injury.
Brown sought to recover on the writ of trespass, whereby traditionally a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case simply by
proving that his injuries were the direct result of the defendant's
act -a
relationship which clearly existed in the case.
In order for the defendant to invoke the defense of inevitable
accident, he would have had to show that he neither knew nor
could have been expected to know Brown's whereabouts at the
88

One can distinguish among the following strains that converged in the course

of the nineteenth century:
(i) the tendency to regard more and more affirmative conduct as equivalent
to passive, background activity. The English courts took this view of activities
that one had a right to engage in. See Tillett v. Ward, zo Q.B.D. 17 (1882) (right
to drive oxen on highway; no liability for damage to ironmonger's shop); Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 28 L.J. Ex. (n.s.) 298 (1859) (right to drive cattle on highway;
no liability to neighboring property). The American courts started with the suggestion in Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62, 65 (1835), that duty-bound acts were
to be treated like background risks. Brown v. Kendall, 6o Mass. (6 Cush.) 292,
296 (i85o), extended this category to include all acts "lawful and proper to do,"
thus obliterating the distinction between background risks and assertive conduct.
(2)
the judgment that those who go near dangerous areas, like highways,
"[take] upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger ... "
Fletcher v. Rylands, 65 L.R. x Ex. 265, 286 (1866) (Blackburn, J.).
(3) the indulgence by courts in a fallacious reinterpretation of older decisions,
such as Gibbons v. Pepper, 87 Eng. Rep. 469 (K.B. 1695), to stand for the proposition that if the act is "not imputable to the neglect of the party by whom it is
done, or to his want of caution, an action of trespass does not lie . . . ." Harvey
v. Dunlop, Hill & Denio Supp. 193, 194 (N.Y. 1843); cf. Vincent v. Stinehour,
7 Vt. at 64 (If "no degree of blame can be imputed to the defendant, the conduct
of the defendant was not unlawful."). The fallacy of this reasoning is the assumption that recognizing faultlessness as an excuse entailed an affirmative requirement
of proving fault as a condition of recovery (fallacy of the excluded middle).
(4) the positivist view that tort liability was functionally equivalent to criminal liability. I J.AusTiN, LECrURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 416, 516-2o (3d ed. R.
Campbell 1869); J. SALXOND, LAW OF TORTS 12 (3d ed. 1912). According to
this view, requiring an activity to pay its way is to impose a sanction for unlawful
activity.
87 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (185o).
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moment he last raised the stick. Thus, to argue that he should
be excused on the ground of ignorance, he would have had to
show that the situation was such that it was expectable and
blameless for him not to inform himself better of Brown's position before the fateful blow. But an inquiry about the acceptability of the defendant's ignorance as an excuse leads to a broader
assessment of the defendant's conduct in putting himself in a
position where he unwittingly created a risk of harm to Brown.
There is an important difference between (i) looking at the narrower context to determine whether at the moment of heightened
risk -

when Kendall raised the stick

-

his ignorance was ex-

cusable and (2) broadening the context and thereby leveling the
risk by shifting the inquiry from the moment of the stick-raising
to the general activity of separating the dogs. Observing that
distinction was essential to retaining faultlessness as a question
of excusing, rather than justifying trespassory conduct. Yet it
was a distinction that had lost its conceptual force. The trial
judge and Chief Justice Shaw, writing for the Supreme Judicial
Court, agreed that the defense of inevitable accident went to the
adequacy of the defendant's care under the circumstances."8 But
the two judges disagreed on the conceptual status of the issue of
the required care. The trial judge, in line with several centuries
of case authority, saw the issue as an exception to liability, to be
proven by the defendant.89 Shaw converted the issue of the defendant's failure to exercise ordinary care into a new premise of
liability, to be proven by the plaintiff, thus signaling and end to
direct causation as a rationale for prima facie liability.9
Admittedly, Brown v. Kendall could be read as a revision of
the standard for excusing unwitting risk-creation: instead of
extraordinary care, ordinary care should suffice to admit ignorance as an excuse; and it should be up to the plaintiff to prove
the issue. Though the case might have yielded this minor modification of the law, Chief Justice Shaw's opinion created possibilities for an entirely new and powerful use of the fault standard,
and the judges and writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries responded sympathetically. 9 '
" Their difference was one of degree. The trial judge thought the issue was
whether the defendant had exercised extraordinary care, id. at 293; Judge Shaw
saw the issue as one of ordinary care, id. at 296.
9
Id. at 294.
9

Id. at 297.
91 American authorities readily came to the conclusion that fault-based negli-

gence and intentional battery exhausted the possibilities for recovery for personal
injury. See CooLEY, supra note So, at 80, 164; cf. 3 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 74
(2d ed. 1848) (pre-Brown v. Kendall). Trespass survived much longer in the
English literature. See Goodhart & Winfield, Trespass and Negligence, 49 L.Q.
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Shaw's revision of tort doctrine made its impact in cases in
which the issue was not one of excusing inadvertent risk-creation,
but one of justifying risks of harm that were voluntarily and
knowingly generated. Consider the following cases of risk-creation: (i) the defendant operates a streetcar, knowing that the
trains occasionally jump the tracks;9 2 (2) the defendant police
officer shoots at a fleeing felon, knowing that he thereby risks
hitting a bystander;" (3) the defendant undertakes to float logs
downriver to a mill, knowing that flooding might occur which
could injure crops downstream. 4 All of these victims could receive compensation for their injuries under the paradigm of reciprocity, as incorporated in the doctrine of trespassory liability;
the defendant or his employees directly and without excuse caused
the harm in each case. Yet as Brown v. Kendall was received into
the tort law, the threshold of liability became whether, under all
the circumstances, the defendant acted with ordinary, prudent
care. But more importantly, the test of ordinary care transcended
its origins as a standard for determining the acceptability of
ignorance as an excuse, and became a rationale for determining
when individuals could knowingly and voluntarily create risks
without responsibility for the harm they might cause. The test
for justifying risks became a straightforward utilitarian comparison of the benefits and costs of the defendant's risk-creating
activity.9" The assumption emerged that reasonable men do what
Rav. 359 (I933); Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual
Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 CORNELL L. REv. 191 (1965). However, Roberts
argued that trespass died among English practitioners well before the academic
commentators wrote its obituary. Id. at 207-08.
2 See Felske v. Detroit United Ry., 166 Mich. 367, 371-72, 13o N.W. 676, 678
(1911); Kelly v. United Traction Co., 88 App. Div. 234, 235-36, 85 N.Y.S. 433,
434 (igo3). But cf. Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 IM. 260, 82 N.E.
232 (1907)
(applying res ipsa loquitur). Some of the earlier cases exonerating
transportation interests were Beatty v. Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W.
332 (1882) (employing cost-benefit analysis to hold railroad need not eliminate all
risk when designing a grade crossing); Bielenberg v. Montana Union Ry., 8 Mont.
271, 20 P. 314 (1889) (statute making railroads absolutely liable for injury to livestock held unconstitutional; liability had to be based on negligence); Steffen v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 46 Wis. 259, 5o N.W. 348 (879) (train caused rock to shoot
up and hit employee standing nearby; judgment for plaintiff reversed).
" Brown v. Kendall had an immediate impact in Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn.
75, 79-80 (r864) (liability for gun shot wound to bystander only if firing was
negligent as to bystander); see Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (1873); Shaw v.
Lord, 41 Okla. 347, 137 P. 885 (1914).
94
See Hopkins v. Butte & M. Commercial Co., 13 Mont. 223, 33 P. 817 (1893)
(defendant's floating logs caused stream to dam, flooding plaintiff's land and destroying crops; no liability in the absence of negligence).
" The utilitarian calculus did not become explicit until Terry explicated the
courts' .hinking in his classic article, Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. Rv. 40
(1915).
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is justified by a utilitarian calculus, that justified activity is lawful, and that lawful activities should be exempt from tort liability.
In the cases mentioned above, the arguments are readily at
hand for maximizing utility by optimizing accidents: (i) the
expense of providing rails to prevent streetcars from leaving the
tracks would require a substantial increase in streetcar fares it is better that occasional accidents occur; (2) capturing fleeing
felons is sufficiently important to warrant a few risks to onlookers; (3) transporting logs sufficiently furthers the social good to
justify some risks to farmers. More generally, if promoting the
general welfare is the criterion of rights and duties of compensation, then a few individuals must suffer. One might fairly wonder,
however, why streetcar passengers, law enforcement, and the
lumber industry should prosper at the expense of innocent victims.
IV. UTILITY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
The accepted reading of tort history is that the rise of the
fault standard in the nineteenth century manifested a newly
found sensitivity to the morality of legal rules. James Barr Ames
captured orthodox sentiments with his conclusion that "[t]he
ethical standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral
standard of acting at one's peril." 96 This reading of the case
law development finds its source in Holmes' dichotomy between
acting at one's peril and liability based on faulty The assumption of Holmes' influential analysis is that there are only two
doctrinal possibilities: the fault standard, particularly as expressed in Brown v. Kendall,9" and strict or absolute liability.
The latter is dubbed unmoral; therefore, the only option open to
morally sensitive theorists would appear to be liability for fault
alone.
The mistake in this reading of legal history is the unanalyzed
assumption that every departure from the fault standard partakes of the strict liability expressed in the maxim "a man acts
at his peril." There are in fact at least four distinct points on
the continuum from strict liability to the limitation on liability
introduced by Brown v. Kendall. In resolving a routine trespass
dispute for bodily injury, a common law court might, among other
things:
(i) reject the relevance of excuses in principle and rule for the
plaintiff;

" Ames,

Law and Morals, supra note 7, at 99.
" See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 79-80.
See pp. 561-62 supra.

98
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recognize the principle of excusing trespassory conduct, but
find under the facts of the case that the defendant's conduct
was unexcused;
(3) find that the defendant's conduct was excused and therefore
(2)

exempt from liability;
(4) recognize reasonableness as a justification for directly causing harm to another.

If the maxim "acting at one's peril" connotes a standard that
is "unmoral" - a standard that is insensitive to the fairness of
imposing liability - then the charge properly attaches only to
the first of the above four categories. It is only in this situation
that authoring harm is conclusive on liability. Yet there are few,
if any, unequivocal examples of this form of decision in the common law tradition. 9 After Weaver v. Ward,' one can hardly
speak of the common law courts maintaining, as a principle, that
excusing conditions are irrelevant to liability. 1 '
Cases of the second type did abound at the time of Holmes'
writing.' 2 They represent victories for injured plaintiffs, but
they affirm, at least implicitly, the traditional requirement that
the act directly causing harm be unexcused. Yet Holmes treats
these cases as instances of absolute liability, of "acting at one's
peril." 103 In so doing, he ignores the distinction between reject" Even in The Thorns Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 4, f-7, pl. i8 (466), reprinted
FiFooT, HISTORY AND SOURCaS OF THE COMMON LAW 195 (1949), where the
defendant was liable in trespass for entering on plaintiff's land to pick up thorns
he had cut, Choke, C.J., said the defendant would have a good plea if "he [had
done . . . all that was in his power to keep them out]." Id. at 196.
10o 8o Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. i616); see pp. 551-52 supra.
101 See generally Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7

in C.

HARV. L. REV. 441 (894); Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REv.
37 (i926).
102 In some cases, the unexcused nature of the defendant's risk-taking was
obvious on the facts. See Leame v. Bray, 1O2 Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B. 18o3) (defendant was driving on the wrong side of the highway; issue was whether trespass
would lie); Underwood v. Hewson, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. 1724) (defendant
cocked gun and it fired; court held trespass would lie). In Dickenson v. Watson,
84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1682) the court said that the claim of "unavoidable necessity" was not adequately shown. In a third type of case, plaintiffs received verdicts
despite instructions requiring the jury to assess the excusability of the defendant's
act. See Goodman v. Taylor, 172 Eng. Rep. o3i (K.B. 1832); cf. Castle v. Duryee,
2 Keyes 169, 174 (N.Y. 1865) (suggesting that the instructions were too favorable
to the defendant).
103 HoIZIES, supra note 7, at 87-89. Holmes relies heavily on a quote from
Grose, J., in Leame v. Bray, 102 Eng. Rep. 724, 727 (K.B. 1803): "[if . . . the
act of the party . . . be the immediate cause of [the injury], though it happen
accidentally or by misfortune, . . . he is answerable in trespass." Yet Grose, 3.,
relies on Underwood v. Hewson, 93 Eng. Rep. 722 (K.B. 1724), and Weaver v.
Ward, So Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. x66), see pp. 551-52, both of which at least
implicitly recognize excusing conditions. Holmes supposed that if one were liable
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ing excuses in principle (type one) and rejecting an alleged excuse
on the facts of the case (type two). There is an obvious difference between finding for the plaintiff regardless of fault and finding for the plaintiff because the defendant fails to convince the
trier of fact that he acted "utterly without fault." By ignoring
this difference, as well as the distinction between denying fault by
claiming an excuse and urging reasonableness as a justification,
Holmes could generate a dichotomy that made Brown v. Kendall
seem like an admirable infusion of ethical sensitivity into tort
doctrine.
But the issue in the nineteenth century was not the choice
between strict liability on the one hand and liability based on
fault on the other. Nor was it a simplistic choice between an
"unmoral" standard and an ethical one. Rather, the question of
the time was the shape that the fault standard would take. Should
the absence of fault function as an excuse within a paradigm of
reciprocity? Or should it function as a standard for exempting
from liability risks that maximize utility? That was the moral
and policy question that underlay the nineteenth century revolution in tort thinking. The question posed by the conflict of paradigms was whether traditional notions of individual autonomy
would survive increasing concern for the public welfare. If the
courts of the time had clearly perceived and stated the issue,
they would have been shaken by its proportions.
The same fundamental conflict between the public interest
and individual autonomy arose even more sharply in criminal
cases that reached the courts in the late nineteenth century. The
public interest found expression in tort disputes by decisions protecting activities thought to be socially useful, and in criminal
cases by decisions designed to deter activities thought to be socially pernicious. Just as one goal of social policy might require
some innocent accident plaintiffs to suffer their injuries without
compensation, the other might require some morally innocent
defendants to suffer criminal sanctions. Indeed, both matters received decisive judicial action in the same decade. Shortly before
Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork in Brown v. Kendall 0 4
for exempting socially useful risks from tort liability,105 he expressed the same preference for group welfare over individual
autonomy in criminal cases. In Commonwealth v. Mask 106 he
for an "accidental" injury, then liability, in some sense, violated principles of
fairness; but the terms "accident" and "misfortune" are perfectly compatible with
unexcused risk-taking.
104 6o Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (185o).
105 See pp. 561-62 supra.
10648 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844).
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generated a rationale for a bigamy conviction against a woman

who sincerely regarded her absent husband as dead. Shaw tacitly conceded that Mrs. Mash was not blameworthy for entering

into the second marriage." 7 Yet that mattered little, he argued,
for preventing bigamy was "essential to the peace of families and
the good order of society ...
." ' Thus, in Shaw's mind, the
social interest in deterring bigamy justified convicting a morally
innocent woman. 9 Shaw's decision in Mash was of the same
ideological frame as his rewriting of tort doctrine in Brown v.
Kendall. If a judge is inclined to sacrifice morally innocent
offenders for the sake of social control, he is also likely to require
the victims of socially useful activities to bear their injuries without compensation." 0 It is not at all surprising, then, that the
rise of strict liability in criminal cases parallels the emergence
of the paradigm of reasonableness in the law of negligent torts."'
If it is unorthodox to equate strict liability in criminal cases with
a species of negligence in tort disputes, it is only because we
are the victims of the labels we use. If we shift our focus from
the magic of legal rubrics to the policy struggle underlying tort
and criminal liability, then it is quite clear that the appropriate
analogy is between strict criminal liability and the limitation imposed by the rule of reasonableness in tort doctrine.
' Shaw acknowledged the distinction between the "criminal intent" that rendered an actor blameworthy and the "criminal intent" that could be imputed to
someone who voluntarily did the act prohibited by the legislature. Id. at 474. It
was only in the latter sense, Shaw conceded, that Mrs. Mash acted with "criminal
intent."
Id.
'0 8 Id. at 473.
" Before sentence was pronounced, Mrs. Mash received a full pardon from

the Governor. Id. at 475.
110 Recent decisions of the California courts express the opposite position. The
California Supreme Court has sought to protect morally innocent criminal defendants, People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1964) (recognizing reasonable mistake as to girl's age as a defense in statutory
rape cases); People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 85o (1956) (recognizing
reasonable mistake of marital status as a defense in bigamy cases), and at the
same time it has extended protection to innocent accident victims, Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (i969)
(strict products liability extended to bystanders).
...If this thesis is correct, it suggests that the change in judicial orientation
in the late nineteenth century was both beneficial and harmful to large business
enterprises. Limiting tort liability to negligence was obviously helpful in reducing
the costs of doing business; but imposing strict liability on corporate officers raised
the nonmonetary costs of production and marketing. See, e.g., People v. Roby, 52
Mich. 577, i8 N.W. 365 (1884) (proprietor held strictly liable for Sunday sale of
liquor by his clerk without proprietor's knowledge or intent); Regina v. Stephens,
[iS66] L.R. z Q.B. 702 (quarry owner held strictly liable for his workmen's
dumping refuse).
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Not surprisingly, then, the contemporary arguments against
the utilitarianism expressed in strict criminal liability 112 yield a
critique of the rule of reasonableness in tort doctrine. As applied
in assessing strict criminal liability, the utilitarian calculus treats
the liberty of the morally innocent individual as an interest to be
measured against the social interest in deterring criminal conduct; it is a matter of judgment whether to favor the interests
of the individual or the interests of society. But there are some
sacrifices of individual liberty that persons cannot be expected
to make for the welfare of their neighbors. In criminal cases,
the claim of those opposing strict liability is that no man should
be forced to suffer a condemnatory sanction just because his conduct happens to cause harm or happens to contravene a statute.
Something more is required to warrant singling out a particular
defendant and subjecting him to sanctions in the interest of deterring would-be offenders. There must be a rationale for overcoming his prima facie right to be left alone. That rationale is
provided in the contemporary critical literature by the insistence
that only culpable offenders be subject to sanctions designed to
deter others." 3 Culpability serves as a standard of moral forfeiture. 4 It provides a standard for assessing when, by virtue
of his illegal conduct, the defendant should be treated as having
forfeited his freedom from sanctions.
Just as an individual cannot be expected to suffer criminal
sanctions for the sake of the common good, he cannot fairly be
expected to suffer other deprivations in the name of a utilitarian
calculus. His life, bodily integrity, reputation, privacy, liberty
and property - all are interests that might claim insulation from
deprivations designed to further other interests. Insulation might
take the form of criminal or injunctive prohibitions against conduct causing undesired deprivations. But criminal and injunctive
sanctions are questionable where the activity is reasonable in the
sense that it maximizes utility and thus serves the interests of
the community as a whole. Protecting the autonomy of the individual does not require that the community forego activities that
serve its interests. In the case of socially useful activities, then,
insulation can take the form of damage awards shifting the cost
of the deprivation from the individual to the agency unexcusably
2See,

e.g., H. PACKER, THE LmrTs or THE CRInINAL SANCTION 62-135

(1968); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for A Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, i8 SrAN. L. REV. 322 (1966); Griffiths, Book Review, 79
YALE LJ. 1388 (x97o).
1 3 See PACKER, supra note 112, at 62-70; Dubin, supra note 112, at 365-66.
1.4Culpability may also function as a standard of moral desert. I have attempted to clarify the difference between these two functions in Fletcher, supra
note 79, at 417-18.
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causing it. The burden should fall on the wealth-shifting mechanism of the tort system to insulate individual interests against
community demands. By providing compensation for injuries
exacted in the public interest, the tort system can protect indiby taxing, but not prohibiting, socially useful
vidual autonomy
5
activities."'

V.

THE INTERPLAY OF SUBSTANCE AND STYLE

The conflict between the paradigm of reasonableness and the
paradigm of reciprocity is, in the end, a struggle between two
strategies for justifying the distribution of burdens in a legal
system. The strategy of utility proceeds on the assumption that
burdens are fairly imposed if the distribution optimizes the interests of the community as a whole. The paradigm of reciprocity,
on the other hand, is based on a strategy of waiver. It takes as
its starting point the personal rights of individuals in society to
enjoy roughly the same degree of security, and appeals to the
conduct of the victims themselves to determine the scope of the
right to equal security. By interpreting the risk-creating activities of the defendant and of the victim as reciprocal and thus
offsetting, courts may tie the denial of liability to the victim
to his own waiver of a degree of security in favor of the pursuit
of an activity of higher risk.
These two paradigms, and their accompanying strategies for
distributing burdens, overlap in every case in which an activity
endangers outsiders not participating in the creation of the risk.
Where the courts deny liability, say, for leaving a golf club
where a child might pick it up and swing it," 6 they must decide
whether to appeal either to the paradigm of reciprocity and argue
that the risk is an ordinary, reciprocal risk of group living, or
to the paradigm of reasonableness and argue that the activity is
socially beneficent and warrants encouragement. They must decide, in short, whether to focus on the parties and their relationship or on the society and its needs. In these cases where the
paradigms overlap, both ways of thinking may yield the same
result. Yet the rhetoric of these decisions creates a pattern that
influences reasoning in cases in which the paradigms diverge.
The major divergence is the set of cases in which a socially
useful activity imposes nonreciprocal risks on those around it.
1

.. But cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254

(1964), expressing the

view that in some situations tort liability impermissibly inhibits the exercise of
freedom of the press. If the liberty to create risks were conceived as analagous to
free speech, the same criticism would apply to the argument of the text.
11
See Lubitz v. Wells, ig Conn. Supp. 322, 113 A.2d 147 (Super. Ct. 19ss).
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These are the cases of motoring, airplane overflights, air pollution, oil spillage, sonic booms - in short, the recurrent threats of
modern life."' In resolving conflict between those who benefit
from these activities and those who suffer from them, the courts
must decide how much weight to give to the net social value of
the activity. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.," 8 the New
York Court of Appeals reflected the paradigm of reciprocity by
defining the issue of holding a cement company liable for air pollution as a question of the "rights of the parties," "' rather than
the "promotion of the general public welfare." 120 Similarly, in
its recent debate over the liability of airplane owners and operators for damage to ground structures, the American Law Institute
faced the same conflict. It too opted for the paradigm of re2
ciprocity.1 '
A variation on this conflict of paradigms emerges when a
bystander, injured by a motorist, sues the manufacturer of the
vehicle on the theory that a defect in the vehicle caused the accident. In these cases, the ultimate issue is whether the motoring
public as a whole should pay a higher price for automobiles in
order to compensate manufacturers for their liability costs to
pedestrians. The rationale for putting the costs on the motoring
public is that motoring, as a whole, imposes a nonreciprocal risk
on pedestrians and other bystanders. In addressing itself to
this issue in Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 22 the California
Supreme Court stressed the inability of bystanders to protect
themselves against the risk of defective automobiles. Though it
grouped pedestrians together with other drivers in extending strict
products liability, the Elmore opinion appears to be more oriented to questions of risk and of who subjects whom to an excessive risk than it is to the reasonableness and utility of motoring.
17 There is considerable support among commentators for classifying many of

these activities as ultra-hazardous in order to impose liability regardless of their
social value. See, e.g., Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil Spillage, 36 BROOxLYN
L. REV. 359 (1970); Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21
STAN. L. REV. I, 50-53 (1968).
11826 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d

870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
N.Y.2d at 222, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 3o9 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
2
'Id. In deciding whether to grant an injunction in addition to imposing

119 26

liability for damages, however, the court did consider the economic impact of
closing down the cement factory. 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309
N.Y.S.2d at 316.
121 The Institute initially took the position that only abnormal aviation risks
should generate liability for ground damage, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS
§ 52oA (Tent. Draft No. ii, 1965), and then, reversing itself the following session, voted to encompass all aviation risks to ground structure within the rule
of strict liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 52oA, Note to Institute
at i (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
"I 7o Cal. 2d 15, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
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Thus, this opinion, too, hints at a reawakening of sensitivity to
the paradigm of reciprocity.
On the whole, however, the paradigm of reasonableness still
holds sway over the thinking of American courts. The reasonable
man is too popular a figure to be abandoned. The use of litigation
to pursue social goals is well entrenched. Yet the appeal to the
paradigm might well be more one of style than of substance.
In assessing the reasonableness of risks, lawyers ask many
seemingly precise questions: What are the consequences of the
risk, its social costs and social benefits? What specific risks are
included in the "ambit of the risk"? One can speak of formulae,
like the Learned Hand formula, 2 3 and argue in detail about
questions of costs, benefits and trade-offs. This style of thinking
is attractive to the legal mind. Its tracings in proximate cause
cases are the formulae for defining the scope of the risk. Thus
Palsgrafenthrones the "eye of reasonable vigilance" to rule over
"the orbit of the duty." 124 And the standard of "foreseeability"
has become the dominant test of proximate cause. 25 With close
examination one sees that these formulae are merely tautological
constructs designed to support an aura of utilitarian precision.
Only if remote consequences are defined out of existence can
one total up the benefits and the costs of all (known) consequences. The test of "foreseeability" permits balancing by restrictively defining the contours of the scales. Unforeseeable
risks cannot be counted as part of the costs and benefits of the
risk; for, after all, they are unforeseeable and therefore unknowable. 12 6 There may be much work to be done in explaining why
this composite mode of thought -the
idiom of balancing, orbits
of risk and foreseeability - has captured the contemporary legal
mind. But there is little doubt that it has, and this fashionable
style of thought buttresses the substantive claims of the paradigm
of reasonableness.
The paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, for all its
substantive and moral appeal, puts questions that are hardly
12

1

24
1
25

'

See note I9 supra.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
PROSSER

267; WNFIELD ON

248

N.Y. 339, 343,

TORT 91-92 (8th ed.

162

N.E. 99,

leo (1928).

J. jolowicz & T. Lewis

1967). The case adopting the test for the Commonwealth is Overseas Tankship
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), [i961]
A.C. 388. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (no liability for "highly
extraordinary" consequences).
"26Though this aspect of the test is only dimly perceived in the literature,
many scholars favor the test of "foreseeability" (or its equivalent) on the ground
that it renders the issue of proximate cause symmetrical with the issue of negligence.

See R.

KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 18-20

Liability for Consequences, 38 L.Q. REv. 265, I67

(1922).

(1963);

Pollack,
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likely to engage the contemporary legal mind: When is a risk
so excessive that it counts as a nonreciprocal risk? When are
two risks of the same category and thus reciprocally offsetting?
It is easy to assert that risks of owning a dog offset those of
barbecuing in one's backyard, but what if the matter should be
disputed? There are at least two kinds of difficulties that arise
in assessing the relationship among risks. The first is that of
protecting minorities. Does everyone have to engage in crop
dusting for the risk to be reciprocal, or just half the community?
A tempting solution to the problem is to say that as to someone
not engaged in the activity, the risks are per se nonreciprocal.
But the gains of this simplifying stroke are undercut by the
assumption necessarily implicit in the concept of reciprocity that
risks are fungible with others of the same "kind." Yet how does
one determine when risks are counterpoised as species of the
same genus? If one man owns a dog, and his neighbor a cat,
the risks presumably offset each other. But if one man drives
a car, and the other rides a bicycle? Or if one plays baseball in
the street and the other hunts quail in the woods behind his
house? No two people do exactly the same things. To classify
risks as reciprocal risks, one must perceive their unifying features. Thus, risks of owning domestic animals may be thought
to be of the same kind. And, theoretically, one might argue with
equal vigor that all sporting activities requiring the projection
of objects through the air create risks of the same order, whether
the objects be baseballs, arrows, or bullets. Determining the
appropriate level of abstraction is patently a matter of judgment;
yet the judgments require use of metaphors and images - a way
of thinking that hardly commends itself as precise and scientific.
In proximate cause disputes the analogue to this style of
thinking is the now rejected emphasis on the directness and
immediacy of causal links, as well expressed in the Polemis
case 127 and Judge Andrews' dissent in Palsgraf.'2 8 As Hart and
Honore have recognized,' 29 we rely on causal imagery in solving
problems of causal connection in ordinary, nonlegal discourse.
Why, then, does the standard of "direct causation" strike many
today as arbitrary and irrational? 130 Why does metaphoric thinking command so little respect among lawyers? 131 Why not agree
12 In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 56o.
11s Palsgraf

v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 347, 162 N.E. 99, iox (1928).
H.L.A. HART & A. HONOIE, CAUSATION iN THE LAW 24-57, 64-76 (1959).
1"See, e.g., PROSSER 264 ("this approach [i.e. direct causation] is obviously
an arbitrary one"); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39
CoLWx. L. REV. 20, 37, 52 HARv. L. REV.372, 389, 48 YALE LJ. 390, 407 (1939)
("those using the test of directness are merely playing with a metaphor").
121 Part of the reaction against writers like Beale, The Proximate Consequences
'

29
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with Judge Andrews that the issue of proximate cause is akin to
assessing when a stream merges with waters of another source? 132
Metaphors and causal imagery may represent a mode of
thought that appears insufficiently rational in an era dominated
by technological processes. Yet why should the rhetoric of reasonableness and foreseeability appeal to lawyers as a more scientific or precise way of thinking? The answer might lie in the
scientific image associated with passing through several stages
of argument before reaching a conclusion. The paradigm of
reasonableness requires several stages of analysis: defining the
risk, assessing its consequences, balancing costs and benefits. The
paradigm of reciprocity requires a single conclusion, based on
perceptions of similarities, of excessiveness, and of directness. If
an argument requires several steps, it basks in the respectability
of precision and rationality. Yet associating rationality with
multistaged argumentation may be but a spectacular lawyerly
fallacy -akin
to the social scientists' fallacy of misplaced concreteness (thinking that numbers make a claim more accurate).
Whether or not multistaged argumentation is more rational
than a perception of directness or excessiveness, one cannot but
be impressed with the interplay of substantive and stylistic criteria in the conflict between the two paradigms of tort liability.
Protecting innocent victims from socially useful risks is one issue.
The relative rationality of defining risks and balancing consequences is quite another. That there are these two levels of
tension helps explain the ongoing vitality of both paradigms of
tort liability.
The courts face the choice. Should they surrender the individual to the demands of maximizing utility? Or should they
continue to protect individual interests in the face of community
needs? To do the latter, courts and lawyers may well have to
perceive the link between achieving their substantive goals and
explicating their value choices in a simpler, sometimes metaphoric
style of reasoning.
of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1920), is that metaphoric thinking is "mechanical" and insensitive to issues of "policy." PROSSER 264. Legal realism made it
unfashionable to try to solve policy problems with verbal formulae and common
sense rules. See HART & HoNoiRE, supra note 129, at 92-93.
132 248 N.Y. at 352, 162 N.E. at io3.

